3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry:Our assault on the eastern end of the ROCK, beginning at 1830I, met with an immediate enemy counterattack in the vicinity of ENGINEER POINT which was repulsed by tank and Infantry action. Further resistance was met at the southwestern base of MALINTA HILL. Further west, strongest opposition was met on the northern coast between ENGINEER and INFANTRY POINTS. At end of period, our troops had advanced to the northwest-south-east line (34.5-41.2)-(34.8-40.7). Mopping up on the western end of the ROCK met with unexpected resistance on WHEELER POINT where the enemy has very Strong emplacements. Our attacks were only moderately successful."

CASUALTIES:

a. OUR CASUALTIES: To Date- (corrected totals): 123 KIA, 281 WIA, 29 IIA, 209 Jump IIA, 7 MIA.

b. ENEMY KNOWN CASUALTIES: This Report- 704 KIA, 0 PW. To Date- 3170 KIA, 6 PWs.

#110  0300

34th Inf reported three explosions in Malinta Tunnel and flames coming from all entrances. Two more loud explosions followed at about 15 minute intervals and each time flames lite the sky very bright.  Set off by enemy.

#111  0645

 Flames coming from all entrances of Malinta tunnels.

#112  0830

Attack launched East of Malinta Hill supported by air-navy-and artillery fire- opposition light.

#113  0930

Navy blasting Wheeler Point with "D" Co standing by to clean out caves. Very hard place and Nips in caves and well protected by concrete emplacements.

#114  1120

Rock Force east of Malinta Hill report front line to be line running between 34.1-40.9 and 34.2-40.8. Tanks knocked out some resistance at Engr. Pt. Tanks report banzai from Hospital tunnel and killed appx 50. Also tanks to have destroyed 150 enemy on rd junt (33.9-41.0)

#115  1435

A Co sealed five caves at 34.2-40.8 at 1300I. Reports on tanks killing appx 200 nips.

#116  1525

A & C Co progressing well- resistance still light.

#117  1530

Bn C.P. at 34.1-41.0. B Co. between Art & Inf points & will reach Inf point same time as "C" Co.

#118  1630

Advance 1st Bn C.P. set up at (34.08-40.95).

#119  1655

1st Bn CP at (34.4-41.0). A Co advance element at Camp Pt. B Co. mopping up Inf Report. C Co meeting resistance at Inf Pt.

#120  1900

Navy received fire from Monkey pt. and returned fire with good results.

#121  2130

Report from 1st Bn that mortar shell hit C.P.- killing Bn C.O., Maj Woods-S-2- wounding quite a few. Source not known. Third Bn reports believed to be from 34.2-41.3. Wounded evacuated at nite and searching artillery fire placed on area.

#122  0300

From XI Corp- 151 Inf to relieve 34th Inf.

#123  0745

Request of Navy fire by CO 3rd Bn.

#124  0925

CG XI Corp reporting progress of Rock Force on East side of Malinta Hill.

#125  0950

Navy reports 550 Rds used on Wheeler Pt.

#126  1120

CG XI Corp- situation report on Rock force East assault.

#127  1435

Situation report from 1st Bn.

#128  1525

Situation report from 1st Bn.

#129  1530

Situation report from 1st Bn.

#130  1630

3rd Bn C.P. at 34.40-40:95:

#131  1655

Report from CO 1st Bt on progress.

#132  1805

Report from CO 1st Bt on progress.

#133  1900

Report to CO 1st Bn- Navy received fire from Monkey point and neutralized the same.

#134  1915

S-3 report to XI Corp by radio.

#135  2330

Report on mortar fire that hit 1st Bn C.P.

#135  2400

34th Inf with 1st Bn 503 made assault. and Bn moved in at 1400 to support rear. Situation well in hand. 1st Bn C.P. incident unfortunate but organization moved as planned.

"Company went on a patrol in the same area which "E" Co had patrolled the day before. They patrolled the area below the big gun position" (Battery Cheney) "and then started along the shore to "Banzai Point." (Wheeler Point) "The company moved around the point below the big gun position and started meeting enemy resistance. Part of the company moved up along the high ground cleaning out several caves along the way. Pfc. McCarey was killed" (William J. McCarey) "and Drew and F. Keller were lightly wounded." (Harry J. Drews and Prank B. Keller - Drews lost a leg from his 'light' wound.) "The casualties were withdrawn to the beach and evacuated by LCM. Co. proceeded to "Banzai Point" cleaning out several caves along the way. When the Co. started back they were pinned down by machine gun and sniper fire. The machine guns and snipers were in caves on the hillside and could not be seen. They had the company's route of withdrawal covered and supporting fire from ridges was very ineffective: The CO called on LCM's to take them off the beach and started withdrawing toward the beach. Holt and Combs were killed and Puckett died of wounds; Finckler, Kurtz, Chistian, Rabe, Jenkins and Richard were wounded during the withdrawal." (S/Sgt Robert V. Holt, Jr., Cpl Kenneth Combes, Pfc Clifton L. Puckett, Pfc Frank Finckler, Pvt. Charles H. Kurz, Pfc. Charles W. Christian, S/Sgt Harry W.Rabe, Pfc Floyd F. Jenkins and Pfc Edward T. Rickard.) "When the Co. reached the beach they were picked up by LCM's. The Co. moved up to the rear of Bn. and Regt'l CP for a rest.

"Approximately 20 Japs were killed during the day."

The S-3 Regimental Journal says very little after referring to the action at Wheeler Point when E Company withdrew 23 February.

"After Hill's company had neutralized the Wheeler Point area Colonel Jones could begin to plan the rest of his campaign to win back all of Corregidor."

I expect D Company would debate this point. E Company had approached Searchlight Pt. from the east, while D Company's approach to Wheeler Point was from the west. They both arrived at the same enemy defense.

These were the last attacks made on Battery Monja by 503rd units.  They all failed.

At least one heavily supported attack was made later by an infantry battalion, but it, too, failed. At war's end, Battery Monja had not been taken, and was the hub of a small community of bypassed Japanese holdouts who did not surrender until 1 January 1946.

E Company was sent to the beach to attack the Japanese in their prepared positions in the cliffs, positions the Japs had prepared to defend against an attack from the beach. This was exactly what the Japs wanted. E Company's attack was futile. They lost good men and were never able to locate all the Jap positions. The next day D Company was sent down to the beach and caught in an ambush. 

One effective weapon was available. That was the direct fire of the naval guns into the Japanese positions in the cliffs. A destroyer was on call both days, but it was not used. Indeed the area was shelled before the companies moved in, but specific targets, such as Battery Monja, were neither designated nor shelled while the troops waited helplessly below.  This brings to mind that aircraft, which were on tap and looking for targets on 16 February could have taken out Battery Wheeler with a well-placed napalm bomb, but were not called in.  How many times was help available but not used? How many lives were lost?

 So, please, be understanding with small unit leaders who are critical of some command decisions. The powers that be do not have to witness the last earthly moments of the young soldier who had lived with the belief that "it won't happen to me" and is now realizing that it has happened to him. His thought are "No, not me! I don't want to die. I want to stay with all of you. I want to go home again." So, please bear with the grieving non-coms, the privates and Pfc's, the lieutenants, and the captains. Allow them their moments of bitterness. They bear no malice, but they have earned some rights.  Those were brothers they lost.

Don Abbott and John Lindgren visited Corregidor during the spring of 1987. They returned again during the spring of 1989 for a four week stay, which gave them ample time to go over the areas of interest thoroughly. John describes the Battery Monja area as follows:

"I surveyed the entire area where D Company fought, both from the probable enemy position 300 feet upf rom Wheeler Point cliff at Battery Monja and from the company's position on the beach below. I climbed to Battery Monja and then boarding the banca again (of course after climbing back down to the beach), sailed a half mile north and anchored at the mouth of Cheney Ravine. Clumsily walking, half tripping and falling, over the large loose round stones on the beach, I examined the caves dug in the cliffs near Cheney Ravine, all the while keeping an eye on Battery Monja halfway up the cliff at Wheeler Point. Another day I took Cheney Trail to the sea, the same route taken by the Company and spent the day walking the same rock strewn beach trying to understand what happened that bloody afternoon.

That day, the company had gone unmolested along the beach as far as a small knob about 500 yards south of Cheney Ravine, but when they moved around it they were fired upon. The diary describes the small headland as "the point below the big gun position" (i.e. Battery Cheney). According to the war diary, the company then proceeded to "Banzai" Point (i.e. Wheeler Point) and turned back south to Cheney Ravine and came under fire as they moved away from Wheeler Point. At this point it was decided that the company leave the area by LCM's that had been standing off shore during the operation. The bulk of the casualties came when the company moved from the positions near the bottom of the cliffs, where they were somewhat shielded from the fire, to the open beach and the waiting LCM's. It was probably only a matter of min­utes for the enemy gunners pouring fire from the cliff at Wheeler Point to the bloody beach below to kill or wound nine men from the 2d and 3d platoons. Accounts in the diary and elsewhere are confusing when they try to explain the source of enemy fire. There can be little doubt the fire came from positions at Battery Monja.

Tony Sierra was there with the 3d platoon that had two killed and three wounded on the beach. His recollection of the fight is slightly different.

"The company reached the small knob below Battery Cheney and was stopped and never went forward from there. The company withdrew on LCM's from this point about 500 yards from Cheney Ravine and never reached Wheeler Point."

"I believe Sierra's account is the correct one. If you read the diary for 24 Feb 45 and change one word, both accounts are nearly the same.  The diary reads "Co proceeded to 'Banzi (sic) Point..." but if you change "to" to "toward", then Tony's account is substantially the same."

A month or two later, a patrol from the 151st Infantry, that remained on Corregidor after we left, supported by a destroyer, and several amphibious vehicles firing 20mm guns, went into the same beach south of Wheeler Point. They withdrew when their force was raked by heavy fire from the cliffs above. They did not return. They tried to close the battery by inducing landslides and took other measures. But after it all, Battery Monja remained an unconquered Japanese stronghold. They abandoned it on New Year's Day 1946 when they donned their best uniforms and surrendered.  Don Abbott and I may have been the first (and perhaps only) people from the 503d or the 151st Infantry, for that matter, ever to reach the position. At that, the sturdy fortress still held out; it took two attempts, two years apart before we were ever to reach the redoubtable Battery Monja."

"E" company ran into all the action yesterday. They got over 100 Nips in some tough fighting- just smoking them out of tunnel with grenades and bazookas. The cost was two killed and three wounded. Our battalion otherwise was inactive. We had the same perimeter last night, with 75's and mortars banging away all night-bless 'em. This morning the mortar platoon laid down a 25 minute barrage on the ravine between Wheeler and Rock Point."

The barrage must have been laid in Cheney ravine ahead of D Company. There are two ravines between these two points, Cheney and Grubbs.

"Today we are able to send out mail. Coveralls are available for salvage. I wish they'd hand them out so we could peel ours off our skins."

The company is remaining on the perimeter today to rest up and get its ammunition resupplied."

No Entry

F Company was patrolling the Way Hill-Sunset Ridge area to the sea from Cape Corregidor to The Rock Point area. This included Battery Grubbs. The 1st platoon continued to patrol the coastal region and Sunset Ridge. We broke up into squad patrols in order to cover more ground. Pfc Delby Huff found a large Jap ensign in a dark cave in the Sunset Battery area. I traded Huff a pistol for the flag and in August 1991 gave it to the Nimitz Museum in Fredricksburg, Texas. Many medical supplies were found in this area, and another medical dump was found at Battery Rock Point. Many medical chests (gray with white circle in which was a red cross) filled with bandages and dressings. Large amounts of medications were found. We found a binocular microscope in its wooden case and a large chest, about the size of a steamer trunk, packed with dental forceps. These were new forceps covered with cosmoline and wrapped in-heavy waxed paper. We took the microscope to Bill Bailey, because we knew that he planned to go to medical school after the war. We decided that Doc Eppleman (Capt Herbert Eppleman), our regimental dentist, should have the forceps. Getting this heavy chest to Topside took some doing. This was when we started the Chevrolet truck with some hopes of hauling the chest; however, as said before, the radiator was full of holes. Too, as said before, we could not have gone far because of the craters in the road.

During this time Major General Marquat showed up often at the light house. He always seemed to be feeling no pain. He wanted to go with us on a patrol, but we managed to avoid this. He always came with several loaves of bread which quickly disappeared. Sgt Todd told me that the general was trading bread to the 1st platoon for whiskey. I never saw any evidence of any of the members of this squad drinking or possessing any liquor and the general was happy, so that was all there was to that.

General Marquat had commanded Fort Mills at one time and was considered an expert on the fortifications of the fortress. One day I complained about our lack of knowledge of the island. I asked him why weren't we given drawings, maps, etc., so that we would know where the tunnels were, what the " details were of the fortifications and other details which would have been of great value to us. The general looked at me condescendingly and with studied patience informed me that drawings and detailed maps of Corregidor were "Top Secret."

Some of us who have studied Corregidor post-war now  have copies of some of Japan's pre-war maps of Corregidor, and they certainly knew the details. These were used in the attack of the island.

General Marquat was a very nice person, though. Having commanded there, he was hurt over the destruction wrecked on his former post. He was having troubles with living in the past. This is a common malady among many, even today, who were once closely connected to Corregidor..."the golden days".. The magic rubs off on those of us today who study it. Had I been in the general's place I probably would have stayed drunk...